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ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE
WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION
JASON J. CZARNEZKI*
With its abundance of natural resources and due to the state's strong
environmental policies, Wisconsin has "enjoyed a reputation as a state rich in natural
beauty and recreational opportunities." Yet, despite the state's strong environmental
protections, some based upon constitutional principles, this Article addresses whether
Wisconsin's environmental constitutional provisions can be improved upon. This
Article attempts to evaluate the existing environmental provisions in the Wisconsin
Constitution, and considers, looking at a variety of options and sources, whether the
state should proceed forward with any changes, minor or major, to environmental law
in the Wisconsin Constitution. This Article considers expansion of the public trust
doctrine to allow for greater public access and to protect biodiversity and
groundwater, inclusion of an environmental policy statement to symbolize the state's
environmental ethic or inclusion of a stronger affirmative right to a healthy
environment, creation of a mechanism to improve standing in environmental cases,
and the tradeoffs between environmental protection and economic growth.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wisconsin has "more than 15,000 inland lakes, 33,000 miles of rivers
and streams, 5.3 million acres of wetlands, 471,329 acres of state forests,
and a location alongside the Mississippi River, Lake Michigan, and Lake
Superior."1 The founder of Earth Day, Governor Gaylord Nelson, and
Aldo Leopold, author of A Sand County Almanac, called Wisconsin
home. With its abundance of natural resources and traditionally strong
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; A.B., J.D., University
of Chicago. This paper was prepared for the "Wisconsin Constitution Conference - Is the
Wisconsin Constitution Obsolete?" held at Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in
October 2006. I wish to thank Michael Cain, Brian Lambert, Eric Lengell, Mike Lutz, Scott
Moss, Marc Morgan, Michael O'Hear, Alyson Paulick, Eric Preu, Glenn Salvo and Quinn
Williams for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. Jodi Habush Sinykin, At a Loss: The State of Wisconsin After Eight Years Without the
Public Intervenor's Office, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 645, 647 (2004) (citing David Johnson & Laura
Chern, Walking on Water, Wis. NAT. RESOURCES, June 1998, at 6; Wis. Dep't of Tourism,
Wisconsin Tourism Facts, http://agency.travelwisconsin.com/PR/TourismFacts/Facts.shtm).
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environmental policies,2 Wisconsin has "enjoyed a reputation as a state
rich in natural beauty and recreational opportunities."3 The Wisconsin
legislature has passed a multitude of statutes protecting the state's
environment and natural resources,4 adding statutory reinforcement to
the environmental provisions in the Wisconsin Constitution,5 and
Wisconsin courts have upheld limitations on the rights of private owners
to change the essential natural character of their land.6
Yet, despite these environmental protections based upon
constitutional principles, can Wisconsin's environmental constitutional
provisions be improved upon? Anytime one questions whether to
amend or replace a foundation of jurisprudence, it must be done with
deliberate care and caution. Only five states have constitutions older
than Wisconsin (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, and
Rhode Island).7 This is not to say the existing document cannot be
improved upon, but it is to say the existing document has value that
should not be lost. For example, the Wisconsin judicial system has
already created important precedents about the state's public trust in
waterways that must be maintained.8
This Article, as a necessary preliminary inquiry, attempts to evaluate
the existing environmental provisions in the Wisconsin Constitution.
Once one can see what already exists, then one can begin to consider, by
looking at a variety of options and sources (e.g., other state
constitutions), whether the state should proceed forward with any
changes, minor or major, to environmental law in the Wisconsin
Constitution. Part II summarizes and evaluates the Wisconsin
Constitution's environmental provisions, focusing on the public trust of
the state's waterways and the right to hunt and fish. Part III provides
2. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential
Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 892-93 (1996) (describing Wisconsin as
one of five states with the strongest environmental policies and programs despite the lack of
environmental provisions in its constitution).
3. Sinykin, supra note 1, at 647.
4. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. chs. 23 (Conservation), 26 (Protection of Forest Lands And
Forest Productivity), 27 (Public Parks and Places of Recreation), 28 (Public Forests), 29 (Wild
Animals and Plants), 30 (Navigable Waters, Harbors and Navigation), 160 (Groundwater
Protection Standards), 280 (Pure Drinking Water), 281 (Water and Sewage), 283 (Pollution
Discharge Elimination), 285 (Air Pollution), 287 (Solid Waste Reduction, Recovery and
Recycling), 291 (Hazardous Waste Management) (2005-2006).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761,768 (1972).
7. Gordon B. Baldwin, Celebrating Wisconsin's Constitution 150 Years Later, 1998 WiS.
L. REV. 661,661.
8. See infra Part II.A.
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suggestions for environmental provisions that should be debated in any
re-drafting of the Wisconsin Constitution, such as expansion of the
public trust doctrine, the rebirth of the public intervenor, an
environmental policy provision, and a fundamental right to a clean and
healthy environment. Considering the environmental provisions of
other states and the case law interpreting these provisions, it evaluates
the consequences of any such changes and additions. Finally, Part IV
discusses the implicit tradeoffs in environmental law, focusing on how
constitutional provisions might balance economic growth and resource
development with preservation and conservation, especially where those
values may conflict and require compromise (e.g., hunting, recreation,
tourism).
II. WISCONSIN'S ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Wisconsin Constitution contains a number of provisions that
affect, to varying degrees, environmental law and land use, broadly
defined. The constitution details financial provisions related to forests
and minerals,9 creates the Commission of Public Lands, ° establishes
jurisdiction of rivers and lakes providing the foundation for the public
trust doctrine," and contains the recently enacted right to hunt and fish
amendment.'2 The former two provisions affect land use planning. The
Board of Public Lands Commissioners controls the appraisal and sale of
state land, and "[t]he selection of three constitutional officers [to serve
on the board] was designed as a check upon the legislative enthusiasm to
sell land."'13 The general finance provisions provide for the taxation of
forests and minerals, and authorize the legislature, using monies from
the treasury or taxes, to acquire and preserve state forests.' The latter
two provisions are the document's major environmental provisions-the
focus of this Part II-that impact Wisconsin's waterways and the use of
the state's environmental resources.
9. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("Taxes shall be levied upon such property with such
classifications as to forests and minerals including or separate or severed from the land, as the
legislation shall prescribe."); see also id. art. VIII, § 10.
10. Id. art. X, § 7.
11. Id. art. IX, § 1.
12. Id. art. I, § 26.
13. 65 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 28, 29 (1976).
14. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 10; see also Bret Adams et al., Environmental and
Natural Resources Provisions in State Constitutions, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 73,
244 (2002).
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A. The Public Trust Doctrine and Jurisdiction of Rivers and Lakes
Article IX, section 1, of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that
"the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading into the
Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same,
shall be common highways and forever free, as well as to the inhabitants
of the state as to the citizens of the United States."
This provision embodies the public trust doctrine in Wisconsin,
protecting public use rights in navigable waters. The provision has not
been amended since its enactment in 1848, when the provision's
language was borrowed from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the
Wisconsin Enabling Act, the federal statute authorizing the Territory of
Wisconsin to organize as a state. 5 The public trust doctrine "posits that
some resources are subject to a perpetual trust that forecloses private
exclusion rights."'6 The public trust doctrine, which finds its roots in
Roman law and English common law, 17 was incorporated into the law of
the American colonies and future territories, and was recognized by the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Illinois Central.8 Under the
equal footing doctrine, when Wisconsin entered the Union, the beds of
the navigable waters, which had been held in trust by the federal
government, were transferred to the state.' 9
The state, serving as trustee, holds title to navigable waters in trust
for the citizens of the state and the nation. The boundary of the trust
associated with the beds of navigable waters is the ordinary high-water
mark. 20 The waterways protected by the doctrine have been broadened
past commercial use 21 to include any waterway capable of recreational
15. JACK STARK, THE WISCONSIN STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 177
(Reference Guides to the State Constitutions of the United States, No 28, G. Alan Tarr series
ed., 1997).
16. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 800 (2004).
17. Erin S. Koch, Finding a Positive Right for the Public Trust in Wisconsin, 8 WIS.
ENVTL. L.J. 137, 147 (2002) (citing JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER
RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 514 (2d ed. 1991)); Melissa Kwaterski Scanlan, The
Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine and the Degradation of Trust Resources: Courts,
Trustees and Political Power in Wisconsin, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 135, 141 n.4, 212 (2000) (citing
HELEN ALTHAUS, PUBLIC TRUST RIGHTS 23 (1978) ("By the law of nature these things are
common to all mankind-the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the
sea.")).
18. I11. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1982).
19. See id. at 457-58 (states were given title to lake beds when they were admitted to the
Union); see also Pollard v. Hogan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
20. State v. Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 101, 408 N.W.2d 337, 341 (1987).
21. Olson v. Merrill, 42 Wis. 203, 212 (1877) (discussing the saw-log test for navigability).
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interests, 2 so long as the waterway is "navigable in fact. 23 Navigable
waterways also include those waterways that are not continually
navigable24 and even artificial waterways so long as they are connected
to natural navigable waters.' The doctrine protects a significant
amount of the state's waterways and water resources to be used for
public purposes.26 In Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court recognized the public nature of navigable waters and
held that the state's navigable waters "should be free to all for
commerce, for travel, for recreation, and also for hunting and fishing,
which are now mainly certain forms of recreation., 27 And in Nekoosa-
Edwards Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission,28 the court recognized that
navigable waters "have ceased to be navigable for pecuniary gain," and
that with population increase, the waters will be used for a variety of
additional recreational purposes such as sailing, rowing, canoeing,
bathing, and skating.29
The constitutional provision serves as authority for legislative and
administrative action. The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") serves as the administrative agency that enforces the public
trust, mostly through statutes passed by the legislature to protect the
resources held in trust.3° Chapter 30 of the Wisconsin Statutes, for
example, establishes limitations on building structures on or near the
22. See State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 465, 338 N.W.2d 492, 498 (1983).
23. Vill. of Menomonee Falls v. Dep't of Natural Res., 140 Wis. 2d 579, 586, 412 N.W.2d
505, 508 (1987).
24. See Olson, 42 Wis. at 212; DeGayner & Co. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 70 Wis. 2d 936,
945, 236 N.W.2d 217, 221 (1975).
25. Klingeisen v. Dep't Natural Res., 163 Wis. 2d 921, 929, 472 N.W.2d 603, 605 (Ct.
App. 1991).
26. For a general discussion of Wisconsin's Public Trust Doctrine, see ROBERT KITE,
Wis. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, VOL. IV, NO. 4, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
(2004), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/LRB/pubs/consthi/04consthilV4.htm; STARK,
supra note 15, at 176-80; Paul G. Kent, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Twenty-First Century:
Challenges and Opportunities, in WISCONSIN'S WATERS: A CONFLUENCE OF PERSPECTIVES
37-50 (Curt Meine ed., 2003); Jack Stark, A Comparison of the Wisconsin and Iowa
Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1019, 1022-26 (2000); John Quick, Comment, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Wisconsin, 1 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 105 (1994).
27. 156 Wis. 261,271,145 N.W. 816, 820 (1914).
28. 201 Wis. 40, 228 N.W. 144 (1930).
29. Id. at 47, 228 N.W. at 147.
30. Hilton v. Dep't of Natural Res., 2006 WI 84, 1 19-20, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 9$ 19-20, 717
N.W.2d 166, 1$ 19-20 (internal citations omitted) ("The legislature has the primary authority
to administer the public trust for the protection of the public's rights, and to effectuate the
purposes of the trust .... The legislature has delegated to the DNR the duty of enforcing the
state's environmental laws.").
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beds of navigable waterways and altering the landscapes of state
waterways.3 However, the public trust doctrine not only protects the
public's rights to use the state's waterways physically by mandating
public access and limiting roadblocks to navigation,32 but it also protects
against environmental and aesthetic degradation. The public trust
doctrine has provided for the protection of shoreland and wetlands
areas through shoreland zoning ordinances,33 preserved aesthetic
beauty, 34 limited the discharge of fill into navigable waters,35 stopped
development that would harm fish spawning and nursery habitat, water
quality, and aquatic plants, 6 halted the draining of major lakes,37 and
helped to promote clean, unpolluted waters. 3'
B. The Right to Hunt and Fish Amendment
Recently enacted via the constitutional amendment process in April
2003, article I, section 26, of the Wisconsin Constitution states: "The
people have the right to fish, hunt, trap, and take game subject only to
31. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 30.13 (wharves, piers, swimming rafts), 30.12 (structures and
deposits), 30.19 (grading on the bank, ponds), 30.20 (dredging) (2005-2006).
32. The public trust doctrine states that one cannot impede navigability by building a
bridge, Barnes v. City of Racine, 4 Wis. 474 (1854), breakwater, Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
32 Wis. 2d 608, 146 N.W.2d 577 (1966), or dam, Att'y Gen. v. City of Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400
(1875); Wis. River Improvement Co. v. Lyons, 30 Wis. 61 (1872). The public trust doctrine
includes navigable waters and the shores appurtenant to ensure public access and free use of
the waters. State v. Town of Linn, 205 Wis. 2d 426, 445,556 N.W.2d 394, 402 (Ct. App. 1996).
However, if the state uses its statutory authority to create public access over the private
property of riparian owners that have "exclusive privileges of the shore for the purposes of
access to [their] land and the water," then compensation may be required. Doemel v. Jantz,
180 Wis. 225, 234, 193 N.W. 393, 397 (1923); see also Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 426-27,
334 N.W.2d 67, 72 (1983).
33. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972); see also State
v. Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 101,408 N.W.2d 337, 341 (1987).
34. In Claflin v. Department of Natural Resources, 58 Wis. 2d 182, 193, 206 N.W.2d 392,
398 (1973), the court upheld the removal order of a boathouse stating, "The natural beauty of
our northern lakes is one of the most precious heritages Wisconsin citizens enjoy." See also
City of Madison v. State, 1 Wis. 2d 252, 83 N.W.2d 674 (1957).
35. Hixon, 32 Wis. 2d at 631, 146 N.W.2d at 589 (stating that fill must be limited so that
the body of water is not "eaten away").
36. Sterlingworth Condo Ass'n v. Dep't of Natural Res., 205 Wis. 2d 710, 556 N.W.2d
791 (Ct. App. 1996).
37. Priewe v. Wis. State Land & Improvement Co., 103 Wis. 537, 552-53, 79 N.W. 780,
782-83 (1899) (overturning legislative enaction that authorized draining of Muskego Lake
and holding that the lake must be restored).
38. Reuter v. Dep't of Natural Res., 43 Wis. 2d 272, 280, 168 N.W.2d 860, 863 (1969)
(holding that before any water regulation permit could be issued, water quality impacts must
be considered).
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reasonable restrictions as prescribed by law." While other states also
have a constitutional right to hunt or fish,39 Wisconsin provided for a
right to hunt and fish via the public trust doctrine and the common law
prior to the existence of the amendment-raising the question of why
the amendment was necessary at all. In Willow River Club v. Wade, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the right to fish is a public right and
riparian owners cannot prevent fishing in navigable waters,' and, in
Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, it held that the public trust doctrine
includes the right to hunt on the state's waterways and wetlands."
The amendment eliminates the possibility that hunting or fishing
could be banned in Wisconsin, ending any concern that animal rights
activists or preservationists would succeed in outlawing hunting and
fishing.42 But absent this unlikely initiative, the right to hunt has been
primarily litigated elsewhere by individuals trying to avoid state or
municipal regulation,43 or it has been used as a defense against a state
prosecution for violating hunting or fishing regulations." These
strategies have been unsuccessful. Courts have upheld reasonable
hunting and fishing regulations,45 and a hunter or fisherman does not
have a valid defense in invoking his right to hunt under Wisconsin's
article I, section 26, if the law he or she has violated is a reasonable
restriction on the right.46
In Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources,47 a citizens group brought action
seeking the court's declaration that hunting season on mourning doves
was invalid. After affirming the DNR's express authority to adopt such
regulations, the court addressed the recently passed right to hunt
amendment. The court stated that "[t]he 2003 amendment does not
impose any limitation upon the power of the state or DNR to regulate
hunting, other than that any restrictions on hunting must be
39. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 25 (right to fish); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 67 (right to hunt
and fish).
40. Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86, 76 N.W. 273 (1898).
41. Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261,272, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (1914).
42. See James A. Swan, The Right to Hunt How to Say It-and Keep It, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE, Nov. 19, 2002, http://www.nationalreview.com/swan/swanlll902.asp.
43. See, e.g., Orion Sporting Group, LLC v. Bd. of Supervisors, 68 Va. Cir. 195 (2005).
44. See, e.g., Ala. Dog Hunters Ass'n v. State, 893 So. 2d 1224 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).
45. State v. Bontrager, 683 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); State v. Warden, 901
P.2d 900 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
46. Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. Dep't of Natural Res., 2004 WI 40, 1
46, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 46, 677 N.W.2d 612, 46.
47. Id. 1 1, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 1, 677 N.W.2d 612, 1.
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reasonable." 8 The court declined to go further and specify a test for
determining reasonableness for state hunting regulations, but elaborated
on the origins of the right to hunt and fish amendment, finding that "the
... amendment was intended to codify the common law right to hunt
that existed prior to its adoption., 49 The court continued:
In State v. Nergaard, 124 Wis. 414, 420, 102 N.W. 899
(1905), this court declared that the citizens of the state
have a common law right to hunt and fish game as they
see fit in the absence of state regulations, so long as they
do not infringe private rights....
The language of the 2003 constitutional amendment
closely parallels the language in Nergaard, providing that
the people of this state have the right to take game,
subject to reasonable regulations.0
Thus, the right to hunt and fish is little more than a codification of a
right that is limited by reasonable DNR regulations. The DNR "has
broad authority as custodian of Wisconsin's wildlife to . . . maintain a
balance between conserving and exploiting the state's wildlife."51 The
right to hunt and fish amendment appears to have little substantive
effect, and may be an unnecessary provision in the state constitution, as
the provision may be used to unsuccessfully challenge the
reasonableness of every season, catch limit, and designated area where
hunting is allowed, adding to the administrative burden of state
government. Ironically then, the right to hunt and fish has created
additional administrative costs inhibiting the state's wildlife
management efforts that seek to conserve the very natural resources
used by hunters and fishermen.
48. Id. 46, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 46, 677 N.W.2d 612, 46.
49. Id. 45,270 Wis. 2d 318 45,677 N.W.2d 612, 45.
50. Id. [ 45-46, 270 Wis. 2d 318, [ 45-46, 677 N.W.2d 612, T$ 45-46.
51. Id. 23, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 23, 677 N.W.2d 612, T 23 (citing Barnes v. Dep't of
Natural Res., 184 Wis. 2d 645, 660, 516 N.W.2d 730, 737 (1994)).
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III. MISSING ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS IN WISCONSIN'S
CONSTITUTION?
This Part III, considering Wisconsin legal history and the
constitutions of other states,52 offers suggestions for environmental
provisions that should be debated in any re-drafting of the Wisconsin
Constitution. It considers expansion of the public trust doctrine, the
addition of an environmental policy provision, the inclusion of a
fundamental right to a clean and healthy environment, and the rebirth
of the public intervenor and other ways to broaden standing.
A. Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine
There are clear advantages to constitutionalizing the public trust
doctrine 53-the public trust in navigable waters effectively protects
commercial and recreational use, scenic beauty, and environmental
quality. 4 To this end, perhaps the public trust doctrine in Wisconsin
should be made more explicit rather than relying on the "common
highways and forever free" language taken from the Northwest
Ordinance. That said, there may be advantages to maintaining the
precedent of existing language.5
However, whereas Wisconsin currently limits its public trust doctrine
to navigable waters, any constitution convention should consider
expanding the doctrine. The Pennsylvania Constitution, for example,
proclaims that the state's "natural resources are the common property
of all people, including generations to come. 5 6 Article XI, section 1, of
the Hawaii Constitution states that "All public natural resources are
held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people."
Either through legislative action mandated by the constitution itself
or through additional constitutional language, an expanded public trust
52. One could rely on not only state constitutions, but also the constitutions of foreign
countries. See Janelle P. Eurick, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment:
Enforcing Environmental Protection Through State and Federal Constitutions, 11 INT'L
LEGAL PERSP. 185 (2001).
53. Thompson, supra note 2, at 908 ("State constitutions therefore should incorporate a
basic public trust doctrine.").
54. See supra Part II.A.
55. If the provision was not included in a new Wisconsin Constitution, it may
nevertheless survive as the Northwest Ordinance and Wisconsin Enabling Act remain viable
following passage of a state constitution because they provide conditions upon which the
State of Wisconsin was permitted entrance to the Union. Cf. Branson Sch. Dist. v. Romer,
161 F.3d 619, 634 (10th Cir. 1998).
56. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
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doctrine could take on a variety of forms. First, the public trust doctrine
could contain a broader public access provision. Existing doctrines are
"too narrow both in their focus on navigation and fishing and in their
application just to navigable waterways and foreshore."57 The doctrine
could include a broader set of lands such as public parks, forests, and
undeveloped areas.58 Any constitutional convention should then ask, in
determining whether to expand the public access prong of the public
trust doctrine, what lands should be included and what types of rights
the public should enjoy in these protected lands.
For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Doemel v.
Jantz resulted in the public not being able to access exposed beds of the
Great Lakes below the ordinary high-water mark.59 Compare this to the
decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Glass v. Goeckel, where
the court held that the public does have a right of access to these areas.60
In addition, the Wisconsin legislature has limited public access to shore
areas along a stream.1 Perhaps a new constitution could, by itself or by
requiring legislative action, take steps to assure greater public access
along all lakes and streams, including the Great Lakes.6
Second, the state could hold wildlife resources in trust for the benefit
of its citizens in an effort to maintain biodiversity. 63 The scope of the
public trust doctrine in other states has expanded to include more
resources, 64 and courts have recognized that states "have the right and
the duty . . . to preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife
resources."65 Several commentators have suggested that incorporating
wildlife into the public trust is a legally sound and beneficial approach.
66
57. Thompson, supra note 2, at 888.
58. See id.
59. 180 Wis. 225, 193 N.W. 593 (1923); see also supra note 32; infra text accompanying
notes 178-79.
60. 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005).
61. WIS. STAT. § 30.134 (2005-2006).
62. See generally Editorial, Lake Michigan Beaches; What is a "Public Use"?,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 20,2006, at 16A.
63. See, e.g., Rodger Schlickeisen, Protecting Biodiversity for Future Generations: An
Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 181 (1994).
64. See Darren K. Cottriel, Comment, The Right to Hunt in the Twenty-First Century:
Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save an American Tradition?, 27 PAC. L.J. 1235, 1263-65
(1996).
65. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38,40 (E.D. Va. 1980).
66. See, e.g., Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust
Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 731 (1989); Laurence H. Tribe,
Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE
L.J. 1315, 1317 (1974).
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While neither the Wisconsin Constitution nor case law provides for
the protection of wildlife to retain biodiversity, other states have
undertaken measures to include wildlife in the public trust. Alaska has
67p
arguably given wildlife the greatest trust protection, though for public
use 68 as opposed to preservation of the resource. 9  While the Alaska
Supreme Court has held that its constitutional provision does not
explicitly create a public trust, the court has placed wildlife resources
into a category "analogous" to a public trust' known as the common use
clause. 7' The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that because wildlife is
essential to the economy of the state, it warrants inclusion in the
common use clause. 72
North Carolina has placed wildlife within the public trust by statute.
The North Carolina statutes provide for the "enjoyment of the wildlife
resources of the State [by] all of the people of the State., 73  The
legislative intent was to occupy the conservation and wildlife resources
fields "to the exclusion of all local ordinances."74 The legislature named
the North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission as trustee of wildlife
75
resources.
Through judicial action, the California Court of Appeals held that
the public trust provides for the protection of trout within the state's
67. Meyers, supra note 66, at 730-31.
68. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish,
wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use.").
69. See, e.g., Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 498 (Alaska 1988) (striking down statutes
that gave guides the right to hunt in designated areas exclusively).
70. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Alaska 1999) ("Article VIII does not
explicitly create a public trust; rather, we have used the analogy of a public trust to describe
the nature of the state's duties with respect to wildlife and other natural resources meant for
common use.").
71. See Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 494.
72. Metlakatla Indian Cmty. v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 915 (Alaska 1961) ("The fisheries of
Alaska, although pitifully depleted, are still its basic industry. The economy of the entire
state is affected, in one degree or another, by the plentitude of the salmon in a given season.
The preservation of this natural resource is vital to the state and of great importance to the
nation as a whole.").
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-133.1 (2006).
74. 51 Op. N.C. Att'y. Gen. 85 (1982) ("The unmistakable meaning of these provisions is
that the Legislature has reserved the regulation of wildlife resources to itself and has thus
preempted the entire field to the exclusion of all local ordinances except those which have
only a 'minor and incidental' impact on wildlife conservation (e.g., an ordinance prohibiting
the discharge of firearms from public roads).").
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-247 (2006).
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waters.7 6 The court noted that "[w]ild fish have always been recognized
as a species of property the general right and ownership of which is in
the people of the state." 7 Similarly, Illinois has placed wildlife within
the public trust,8 though the court balanced the public benefits of
constructing a bridge with the costs to wildlife.7 9 The court ruled that
the "legislature may reallocate property from one public purpose to
another without violating the public trust doctrine."'
Third, to what extent should the application of the public trust
doctrine be expanded under the existing constitutional provision to
groundwater as pollution or overuse (e.g., through high-capacity wells)
might adversely impact traditional navigable waters? While it is likely
that groundwater is "plainly outside the scope" of the plain language of
Wisconsin's existing public trust provision,81 any new constitution should
consider a provision dealing with groundwater withdrawal and creating
an affirmative duty on the legislature (supported by a citizen suit
provision) to enact further groundwater legislation.
While Wisconsin, as discussed above, has historically emphasized the
importance of protecting state waters, citizens can still use this resource.
Thus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that landowners may remove
groundwater for a beneficial use as long as the use is reasonable. 82 In
2003, the Wisconsin legislature passed new legislation requiring permits
for wells that withdraw greater than 100,000 gallons per day.83 Under
the legislation, the DNR must undertake an environmental review of
any of these high-capacity wells that are located in "groundwater
protection areas," that may have a significant environmental impact on
a spring, or that will have a water loss of more than ninety-five percent
of the amount of water withdrawn. 84
However, increasing demand for Wisconsin's groundwater will likely
call for increased control and regulation of the state's groundwater
76. Cal. Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 211 (Ct. App.
1989).
77. Id.
78. Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Il1. App. Ct. 1984).
79. Id. at 1028.
80. Id.
81. Kent, supra note 26, at 43.
82. State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 302, 217 N.W.2d 339, 350-51
(1974).
83. WIS. STAT. § 281.34 (2005-2006).
84. Id.; see also WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ACT MEMO: 2003 WISCONSIN ACT 310,
HIGH CAPACITY WELLS (May 17, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.uslc/
actmemo/2003/act310-ab926.pdf.
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resources. Development, including condominiums, lake homes, and
hotels in Wisconsin, has threatened the state's water resources.85 As
landowners convert natural areas to suburban environments, wetlands
and shorelines degrade,86 and groundwater demand will increase due to
the need to fill swimming pools and supply hotels and homes.'
Southeastern Wisconsin counties have experienced a decline in
groundwater availability and an increase of pollution in the supply.' As
a result, some have even proposed purchasing water from other counties
with access to Lake Michigan water. 9  Because the supply of
groundwater is limited, Wisconsin may wish to exert far greater control
over the diminishing resource.
Although the legal connection between the existing public trust
doctrine and groundwater does not presently exist, the ecological
connection is strong. Surface waters and groundwater are connected;
the pollution of surface water causes groundwater pollution.90 In
addition, depleting surface water results in a corresponding decrease in
groundwater. 9' As scientists have discovered the complexity underlying
surface and groundwater resources, public officials have called for
greater control. The Wisconsin legislature has relied upon the DNR to
"protect, maintain and improve the quality and management of the
waters of the state, ground and surface, public and private." 93 Placing
groundwater within the public trust would give the DNR greater control
over the complexity of groundwater resources and the interconnections
between groundwater and surface water.
To summarize, climate change, recreation and residential demands,
pollution, and pressure to export Great Lakes water are all challenges to
water resource decisions.94  The importance and complexity of
groundwater resources demands greater control by the DNR. Altering
the Wisconsin Constitution to place groundwater within the public trust
85. See Scanlan, supra note 17, at 173-74.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. Darryl Enriquez, Selling Water to Waukesha Could Be Liquid Gold Mine,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 22, 2006, at 1A.
89. Id.
90. See Kent, supra note 26, at 39.
91. Joseph Sax, We Don't Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 269, 270-71 (2003).
92. Kent, supra note 26, at 42.
93. WIS. STAT. § 281.11 (2005-2006).
94. Kent, supra note 26, at 42.
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doctrine would elevate the priority of groundwater withdrawal in the
legislature and the executive branch.95
Finally, the constitution might provide for a method to expand trust
lands. A portion of the sale of public lands in Wisconsin goes towards a
Common School Fund.9 6  An alternative approach exists where
Wisconsin can instead retain ownership of these lands and use them as
land trusts. 7 Due to the temptation to sell public lands for immediate
revenues, 98 the provision should place limitations and checks on the
ability to sell off public lands. The Board of Commissioners of Public
Lands ("BCPL"), as currently designed in the Wisconsin Constitution,
does not provide adequate protection from the removal of lands from
the public trust. Instead, a revised state constitution, with expanded
trust lands, would require an independent commission, wholly separate
from the legislature, that would manage lands to benefit the lands
themselves.
Should lands currently held as a part of the School Fund or other
additional lands be placed in a land trust, the BCPL would likely be an
insufficient check on the sale or exchange of the lands. Case law in
Wisconsin reveals that the procedure of sale by the BCPL, as well as the
determination of which lands to sell, is subject to legislative
interference. 99  An effective land trust provision would shield
commissioners from the discretion of lawmakers, and, if a newly created
land trust is to be managed according to principles of preservation and
conservation, a new constitutional provision should appoint at least one
95. See id. at 43.
96. WIs. CONST. art. X, § 2.
97. A constitutional convention would have to address whether the benefits of
preservation through land trusts outweigh the decrease in educational funding. Alex
Sienkiewicz, A Battle of Public Goods: Montana's Clean and Healthful Environment
Provision and the School Trust Land Question, 67 MONT. L. REV. 65, 77 (2006) ("Rising
education costs thus diminish the effect of the state's funding contributions. As education
costs to school districts rise, the state share of funding will diminish as a percentage of total
school district budgets, unless, of course, trust land revenue generation is increased at a rate
commensurate with rising education costs.").
98. Id. at 86 ("The Land Board [in Montana] is composed completely of elected officials.
The political dynamic that favors short-term revenue maximization would be tempered by
diversifying the Board's membership.").
99. See, e.g., State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 103-10; 151 N.W. 331, 358-60
(1915) (recounting the early history of legislative interference in the disposition of swamp
land in the state trust funds); State ex rel. Sweet v. Cunningham, 88 Wis. 81, 84-85, 57 N.W.
1119, 1121 (1894) (discussing a statutory prohibition on the sale of land that had once been
withdrawn from sale by the commissions, unless the commissioners re-offer and regularly
advertise the sale); State ex rel. Parsons v. Comm. of Sch. & Univ. Lands, 9 Wis. 213, 215
(1859) (holding that the commission cannot sell land when the state lacks title to the land).
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individual knowledgeable about conservation and preservation goals
and practices.
If a land trust were established, the commission would require
guidelines directing it when to hold on to lands and when to sell lands.
Currently, the constitution authorizes the BCPL to sell lands unless it
deems the sale to be economically detrimental.'0° Surely, the secretary
of state, treasurer, and attorney general comprising the BCPL'o are able
to predict when a land sale would not be of benefit financially.
However, these individuals arguably do not possess the knowledge to
independently determine when lands held in a land trust may be
disposed of. Allowing the legislature to tell the BCPL when the sale is
appropriate may well result in the sale of ecologically beneficial lands
for economic gain. A commission in charge of managing lands held for
conservation and preservation objectives should be managed by persons
who have an interest in and an understanding of natural resource
preservation and management.
An enlarged public trust doctrine in Wisconsin would arguably
improve environmental quality and access. More specifically, including
wildlife and groundwater in the trust may play a role in conserving those
resources in the state. However, a provision in the constitution that
includes those resources will likely lack the specificity required for
proper judicial interpretation and legislative policymaking. Without
more specificity, Wisconsin courts will have difficulty interpreting the
provision; as a result, courts may construe such a provision too
narrowly. 2 Thus, while an expanded public trust doctrine may serve as
the basis to improve environmental quality and access, the doctrine,
absent complex and cumbersome constitutional provisions, still depends
on legislative and administrative action to add specificity to its scope,"'
or alternatively on increased judicial policy-making.
Simple inclusion of these more expansive public trust provisions will
force legislative and administrative action to deal with concerns of
overuse of groundwater or destruction of biodiversity. Yet, the state
could further expand the public trust provision in the constitution to
100. See Wis. CONsT. art. X, § 7; Sweet, 88 Wis. at 83, 57 N.W. at 1120-21.
101. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 7.
102. See Jason J. Czarnezki, Shifting Science, Considered Costs, and Static Statutes: The
Interpretation of Expansive Environmental Legislation, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 395, 396 (2006).
103. State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 465, 338 N.W.2d 492, 498 (citing Ashwaubenon v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 22 Wis. 2d 38, 49, 125 N.W.2d 647, 653 (1963)) ("The primary authority
to administer [the] trust for the protection of the public's rights rests with the legislature,
which has the power of regulation to effectuate the purposes of the trust.").
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create a self-executing"M legal right.1 5 This right would impose a "duty
upon the state to act in the interest of the public trust and allow[]
individuals to bring a cause of action against the state for the disregard
or misapplication of that duty."1" In other words, the provision would
be more than a policy statement requiring further legislation."17
Would such a forceful and affirmative duty for legislative action
under the public trust doctrine actually lead to better environmental
policy and protection? With greater citizen standing, might the
provision shift the burden of proof for an agency to prove affirmatively
that it is doing everything it can to protect the public trust?"° How does
one justify such constitutional breadth when judges may lack the
necessary expertise in environmental matters?1" Would the provision
simply be symbolic? What is the scope of the legislative duty110 and how
would it be enforced? At some point, expansion of the public trust
doctrine begins to look like an environmental policy provision or
individual right to a healthy environment. These concerns, addressed
below, apply to any such expansion.
104. Many constitutional provisions are not self-executing in that they do not forbid,
authorize, or require any behavior, and instead are dependent upon legislative action. Jack
Stark, Enigmatic Grants of Law-Making Rights and Responsibilities in the Wisconsin
Constitution, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 961, 965-66 (1998); see also Robert J. Klee, What's Good for
School Finance Should Be Good for Environmental Justice: Addressing Disparate
Environmental Impacts Using State Courts and Constitutions, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 135,
175-76 (2005). Even for fundamental federal constitutional rights, Congress had to pass 42
U.S.C. § 1983 before plaintiffs could sue for damages for the violation of constitutional rights.
While some environmental constitutional provisions are self-executing (in Illinois, Hawaii,
and New York), Klee, supra at 176, they, in my view, merely broaden standing, but do not
shed light on the scope of environmental rights. See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2; HAW. CONST.
art. XI, § 9; N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 5; see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 27, interpreted in
Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 302 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1973), affid, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973); Mary Ellen Cusack, Judicial Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights to a Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173, 185
(1993) (citing Mont. Wilderness Ass'n v. Bd. of Health & Envtl. Sci., 559 P.2d 1157 (Mont.
1976)).
105. See Koch, supra note 17.
106. See id. at 138.
107. See id. at 142.
108. See id. at 165.
109. See id. at 165-66.
110. See id. at 166 ("The major difficulty in interpreting Section 1 as a positive right is
the nonexistence of any limitations on that positive right.").
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B. Environmental Goals and Environmental Rights
While some states have no environmental provisions at all in their
constitutions (e.g., Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, and Maryland),
over one third of the states have constitutions that contain a wide
variety of broad provisions setting forth goals to maintain a healthy
environment and protect the state's natural resources,"' and four
states-Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, and Pennsylvania-have constitutions
that explicitly establish environmental rights and call for state action to
support those rights."' However, "none of the five states with the
strongest environmental policies and programs (California, Connecticut,
New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin) has environmental policy
provisions in its constitution.""13 Does this suggest that environmental
policy or rights provisions are unnecessary, or might they help shape a
state's environmental ethic and provide a means to enforce the goal of a
healthy environment?
As noted elsewhere,"4 the examples from other states vary
considerably, from simply authorizing the legislature to protect the
environment," 5 to encouraging legislation by stating environmental
policy goals," 6 to going as far as creating explicit environmental rights"7
or imposing environmental responsibilities on citizens." 8 If Wisconsin
chooses to re-draft its constitution, it must consider adding an
environmental policy statement or including a right to a healthful
environment, and must determine the strength of any such provision.
1. An Environmental Policy Provision
According to Stanford Law Professor Barton "Buzz" Thompson,
"searching for some minimal and fundamental environmental goal is an
attractive, but ultimately futile, endeavor.""' 9 Nevertheless, while a
111. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 923 tbl.3.
112. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and
Future of Montana's Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 161 (2003) (citing
HAW. CONST. art XI, §§ 1, 7, 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-2; MONT. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-3;
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27).
113. Thompson, supra note 2, at 892-93.
114. Id. at 871-73.
115. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art III, § 6, 2(a)(1).
116. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
117. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art XI, § 9.
118. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art XI, § 1.
119. Thompson, supra note 2, at 895; see also Matthew Thor Kirsch, Upholding the
Public Trust in State Constitutions, 46 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1171 (1997) ("Since the earliest
environmental provisions were enacted, however, commentators have almost universally
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broad environmental policy statement may be unhelpful due to a lack of
judicially manageable standards, he also recognizes that an
environmental policy provision in the constitution can be effectively
symbolic, helping to create an environmental ethic within the state.12
Constitutional intervention can also be necessary to deal with long term
concerns such as sustainability'21 and "depletion of exhaustible
resources,... endangerment of species, [and] global climate change."'22
Not including an environmental policy provision allows states with
otherwise strong environmental ethics to fail to reflect a policy norm
and leave the constitution with a pro-development bias,1 23 allows
legislatures to slight the environment in favor of economic interests, 24
and potentially neglects the interests of future generations.
The problem with any environmental policy provisions is the
difficulty in providing substantive standards for judicial review. What is
the scope of the provision? "[J]ust what does such a provision require a
defendant to do, or refrain from doing?"'2" Alternatively, some state
constitutions contain detailed provisions that resemble legislative
statutes or administrative regulations. This type of constitutional hyper-
legislation should be avoided.'26 Despite providing explicit standards,
these provisions make it difficult for state governments to change
policies in light of changed conditions. 
2 7
Including a broad environmental policy statement may have
symbolic value, but it forces courts to help shape complex state
lamented their ineffectiveness."); Thompson, supra note 112, at 158 ("Such environmental
provisions have had little consequence in most of the states that have adopted them.").
120. Accord Thompson, supra note 2, at 903 ("At least in theory, incorporation of
general values into a state constitution also can help define and promote community identity
and understanding within a state.").
121. A sustainability clause may benefit future generations. Sustainable yield and
development is the concept that "the possibilities for economic growth are limited both by
natural resource quality and by the assimilative capacity of the environment," and is based in
"intergenerational equity-that is, the current generation must not compromise the ability of
future generations to meet their 'material needs' and to enjoy a healthy environment."
Sandra S. Batie, Sustainable Development: Challenges to the Profession of Agricultural
Economics, 71 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1083, 1084 (1989).
122. See Thompson, supra note 112, at 198.
123. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 905.
124. See id. at 891, 893.
125. Bruce Ledewitz, The Challenge of, and Judicial Response to, Environmental
Provisions in State Constitutions, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 33, 59 (1991).
126. Thompson, supra note 2, at 915-18.
127. See id. at 867.
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environmental policy, which they are ill-equipped to do." As courts are
rightfully reluctant to do so, in terms of having direct substantive
impact, "environmental policy provisions have played an increasingly
marginal role in those states where they are found."'2 9
2. A Right to a Healthful Environment
At least seven state constitutions recognize individuals' right to a
healthful environment, including Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, New
York, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.' 3° If a healthful
environment is deemed extremely important, it has been argued that
perhaps it should not be subject to democratic derogation, absent
constitutional amendment.13' If Wisconsin were to consider a
constitutional provision granting a self-executing right to a healthful
environment, the constitutional convention must consider potential
models for the text's language and address how courts can create
judicially manageable standards and ensure enforcement of the
affirmative right.
In addition, even if judicial standards and effective enforcement
prove elusive, are there symbolic advantages to including a right to a
healthful environment, or, despite the difficulty of judicial enforcement,
will the environment be improved due to added political accountability
in the legislative and executive branches if included in the
constitution? 132 Is the following empirical claim true?: "By making a
healthy environment a constitutional right, the likelihood is increased
that those who control and manage state power will be punished
politically if the environment is damaged or not improved." 1
33
The Pennsylvania and Montana Constitutions contain two of the
broadest environmental rights provisions, with Montana as the
undisputed leader.M Pennsylvania's article I, section 27, states:
128. See id. at 863, 895.
129. See id. at 896.
130. See Cusack, supra note 104, at 181.
131. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 863, 883.
132. See Herman Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitution?,
10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1233, 1239-40 (1995).
133. Id. at 1240.
134. For further discussion of Montana's environmental constitutional provisions, see
Bryan P. Wilson, State Constitutional Environmental Rights and Judicial Activism: Is the Big
Sky Falling?, 53 EMORY L.J. 627 (2004).
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The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's
public natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generations yet to come. As
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people. "'
However, due to judicial interpretation, as discussed below, the
provision has proven to have "more symbolic than substantive value."'
3 6
But, it does "make[] environmental and historic protection part of the
constitutional purpose of state government,"' 137 constitutionalizing the
state's environmental ethic.
Montana's constitutional environmental provisions, undergirded by
more robust language and judicial interpretation, serve as a better
model. Montana's environmental rights provisions, arguably the
strongest of any state, recognize the environmental interests of, and seek
to improve the environment for, future generations, 38 provide for an
"inalienable" "right to a clean and healthful environment," 139 and
mandate that the state legislature "provide adequate remedies for the
protection of the environmental life support system from
degradation,"'" ending any pro-development bias in the state
legislature. Article IX, section 1, provides in full:
(1) The state and each person shall maintain and
improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana
for present and future generations.
(2) The legislature shall provide for the administration
and enforcement of this duty.
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for
the protection of the environmental life support system
from degradation and provide adequate remedies to
135. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
136. John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects
the Environment: Part I-An Interpretative Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 DICK. L.
REv. 693, 696 (1999).
137. Id. at 697.
138. See MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1).
139. Id. art. II, § 3.
140. Id. art. IX, § 1(3).
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prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of
natural resources.1
4 1
In addition, article IX of the Montana Constitution deals with
reclamation of lands damaged by the taking of natural resources, water
rights, and cultural resources. 142
However, it is article II, section 3, that is the key provision:
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable
rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful
environment and the rights of pursuing life's basic
necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties, acquiring, possessing and protecting property,
and seeking their safety, health and happiness in all
lawful ways. In enjoying these rights, all persons
recognize corresponding responsibilities. 143
There is a key difference between an environmental policy statement
that merely permits the legislature to protect the environment or
symbolizes a state's environmental ethic and an individual right to a
healthy environment." While courts are reluctant to enforce policy
statements absent legislation,' 4' an individual right should be self-
executing-though often with difficulty due to a lack of judicially
manageable standards. 4 6  Courts must establish a framework for
interpreting constitutional rights to a healthy environment.
141. Id. art. IX, § 1.
142. Id. art. IX, §§ 2-4.
143. Id. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
144. See Cusack, supra note 104, at 197 ("Without specific language, provisions granting
the individual right to a healthful environment are often mistaken for policy statements.").
145. See id.
146. Professor Thompson also recognized the problem of judicial enforcement.
Thompson, supra note 2, at 872 ("Of those provisions that mandate legislative action without
creating separate environmental rights or duties, only New York's [N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, §
5] addresses enforcement, permitting citizens to sue with the consent of the state's supreme
court; all others are silent regarding enforcement. Most of the constitutional provisions that
create rights or duties in the citizenry explicitly authorize judicial enforcement, although they
often authorize the legislature to limit or regulate the enforcement actions." See, e.g., HAW.
CONST. art. XI, § 9 ("Any person may enforce this right against any party, public or private,
through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as
provided by law.")). Both the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania constitutions are silent
regarding enforcement, despite setting out explicit environmental rights. See MASS. CONST.
art. XCVII, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. Courts in these states, however, still have permitted
suits challenging specific state actions for allegedly violating the constitutional rights. See,
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The Montana courts have ruled that the state's constitution provides
for a self-executing and fundamental right to a healthful environment
that is judicially enforceable against public and private actors.1 47 As it is
a "fundamental" right, the Montana courts have held that the right is
subject to strict scrutiny,"8 potentially revolutionizing judicial review for
actions that impact the environment.1 49 As Professor Thompson stated:
To see the potential ramifications of the strict scrutiny
standard, imagine that an environmental group pushes in
Montana for a higher ambient air quality standard for
sulfur dioxide. The Montana Board of Environmental
Review considers raising the standard, but ultimately
decides that a higher standard is neither justified nor
feasible. Scientists are split on the health risk posed by
the current standard, and companies claim that they
would have to close down if the standard were adopted.
The environmental group sues. Under traditional
judicial review, the environmental group probably would
lose. The board has reached a reasonable factual
determination under the applicable state statute. Under
strict scrutiny, however, the board arguably would have
the burden to show that company closures are a
compelling state interest and that they justify the board's
decision. "
Yet, strict scrutiny for a right to a healthful environment is not
automatic, and perhaps any constitution should specifically state the
level of scrutiny or what factors courts must balance when assessing
actions that impact natural resources and the environment. Absent such
specificity, a court may follow suit with Montana, or alternatively, like
Illinois, may fail to provide for a higher level of scrutiny. 15
e.g., Toro v. Revere, 401 N.E.2d 853 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973), affd, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
147. Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001).
148. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1246 (Mont. 1999)
(holding that the right to a healthful environment was a fundamental right subject to strict
scrutiny); see also Cape-France, 29 P.3d at 1016-17.
149. Thompson, supra note 112, at 176, 183.
150. Id. at 184.
151. See I11. Pure Water Comm., Inc. v. Dir. of Pub. Health, 470 N.E.2d 988, 992 (I11.
1984) ("Plaintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that sections 1 and 2 of article XI
create a 'fundamental' right to a healthful environment, and do not explain why we should
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Pennsylvania courts have developed a three-part test as their
framework for determining whether an action violates the state's
environmental constitutional provisions. The test is:
(1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and
regulations relevant to the protection of the [state's]
natural resources?[;] (2) Does the record demonstrate a
reasonable effort to reduce the environmental incursion
to a minimum?[;] (3) Does the environmental harm
which will result from the challenged decision . . . so
clearly outweigh the benefits to be derived therefrom
that to proceed further would be an abuse of
discretion?
15 2
The test has been called "so weak that litigants using it to challenge
environmentally damaging projects are almost always unsuccessful.' 15 3
That said, how else can courts deal with economic tradeoffs, discussed in
Part IV, without some balancing of competing interests? Strict scrutiny
dictates that environmental interests would usually win out, absent a
compelling interest on the other side, while factor number three above
suggests development or economic interest will nearly always prevail.
An alternative would be to simply employ cost-benefit analysis, but
this often fails to capture the appropriate value of the environment" '
and still results in judicially created environmental policy. Instead,
Wisconsin should consider creating a judicially enforceable default rule
in favor of the environment,'55 while still permitting some balancing-
Do the economic and development benefits that will result from the
project clearly outweigh the value of the environmental resources that will
be damaged? This question is consistent with Professor Joseph Sax's
view of the most common environmental constitutional provision-the
subject statutes affecting the environment to a higher level of scrutiny. In the absence of
more persuasive reasoning, we decline to do so.").
152. Dernbach, supra note 136, at 710 (citing Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973), affd, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976)).
153. Id. at 696, 712-13, 722-24 (discussing Payne, 312 A.2d 86).
154. Jason J. Czarnezki & Adrianne K. Zahner, The Utility of Non-use Values in Natural
Resource Damage Assessments, 32 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 512 (2005) ("[N]on-use
values are frequently underestimated or ignored in determinations of how much polluters
should pay for damages inflicted upon natural resources.").
155. Cf Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, As They Apply to
Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 898 (1994) ("Humility demands that we
prefer erring on the side of preservation to erring on the side of development. Thus, humility
demands a shift in burden of proof as discussed earlier.").
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public trust doctrine. Sax thought the public trust doctrine "required
courts to review with skepticism any government action that restricted
or burdened public access to potentially any natural resource."'
5 6
C. The Public Intervenor and Standing
If a new Wisconsin Constitution were to contain an environmental
policy provision or grant a right to a healthful environment, the
document must also inform the breadth of the standing requirement.1
7
Due to the complicated nature of both individual and associationalstaningin te ev rnme l 158
standing in the environmental context, a reworked constitution may
consider making the public intervenor a constitutionally mandated
officer, permitting lawsuits on behalf of the public interest and the
environment. '59
In essence, Wisconsinites could constitutionalize the earlier state
statute establishing the independent public intervenor to be located in
the Wisconsin Department of Justice' 6' or the DNR, or as an
independent agency. Depending on other changes in the constitution
156. Kirsch, supra note 119, at 1175 (citing Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 556-57 (1970)).
157. Cf Cusack, supra note 104.
158. Look no further than the federal court jurisprudence as to Article III standing and
prudential standing requirements. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1991).
159. See Sinykin, supra note 1; see also Christa Oliver Westerberg, From Attorney
General to Attorney Specific: How State v. City of Oak Creek Limited the Powers of
Wisconsin's Chief Legal Officer, 2001 WiS. L. REV. 1207, 1220. Citizens gained additional
standing through the Public Intervenor Office as the office relied on the Citizen Advisor
Committee consisting of nine citizens with solid environmental credentials to discuss
environmental concerns and suggest where intervention was warranted. Sinykin, supra note
1, at 649. The office also advised citizens on using existing state and local law to protect
families and property from environmental harm. Id. at 650. There are, however, other ways
to reduce the standing requirement. Wisconsin's public trust doctrine itself gives citizens
independent authority to challenge violations of the doctrine, Borsellino v. Dep't Natural
Res., 2000 WI App 27, 232 Wis. 2d 430, 606 N.W.2d 255 (1999), though there are obvious
costs in exercising this authority--costs that would be mitigated with the creation of the
Public Intervenor Office. Other states' environmental provisions have been interpreted to
remove standing barriers. See, e.g., Fielder v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983); City of
Elgin v. County of Cook, 660 N.E.2d 875 (I11. 996). There are also a number of economic
reasons for expanding standing to allow for citizen enforcement clauses and easier standing
requirements: it will create an incentive for firms to reduce pollution; force public agencies to
meet their responsibilities; produce pressure to resolve problems; and halt or delay the worst
abuses. See Donald R. Levi & Dale Colyer, Economic Implications of Some Citizen-Initiated
Legal Mechanisms for Solving Environmental Quality Problems, 53 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
868, 868 (1971).
160. See WIS. STAT. § 165.07 (1993-1994) (renumbered to WIS. STAT. § 23.29 in 1995
and repealed in 1997).
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providing remedial and public interest rights, the Public Intervenor
Office may have an expanded role.
The Public Intervenor Office was created in 1967 by Wisconsin
Governor Warren P. Knowles to protect public rights in natural
resources and ensure democratic participation in environmental matters,
though the office was eliminated, de facto, in the 1995-1996 state budget
and permanently in 1997.161 Under the earlier Wisconsin statute, the
public intervenor received notice of proceedings impacting navigable
waters, air, pollution discharge permits, and could intervene on his or
her own initiative,'62 even to challenge the constitutionality of regulatory
action.63 A public intervenor is necessary to protect the environment
where the attorney general may lack the authority or political will to
challenge legislative or administrative action harming the environment,
for the attorney general may have a duty to defend the constitutionality
of state statutes.164
With the existing (or a potentially expanded) public trust doctrine,
or a new environmental right, a constitutionally mandated Public
Intervenor could protect the environment from competing interests.
With a new environmental policy statement, the Public Intervenor could
provide support for environmental legislation, helping offset the
problem of a lack of substantive standards in an environmental policy
provision.' 65  In the past the Wisconsin Public Intervenor helped see
through passage of Wisconsin's DDT Ban, Acid Rain Legislation, and
1984 Groundwater Law.' 66  The public intervenor also helped
communities deal with local environmental concerns, 67 protect wetlands
161. Sinykin, supra note 1, at 647-48 (citing WIS. STAT. § 165.07 (1993-1994), repealed
by 1995-1997 Budget Act, Act 27, § 4450(b) 1995 Wis. Sess. Laws 535, replaced with Wis.
STAT. § 23.39 (1995-1996), repealed by 1997-1999 Budget Act, Act 27, § 783(x), 1997 Wis.
Sess. Laws 49, 243).
162. Westerberg, supra note 159, at 1220 (citing Wis. STAT. § 165.07 (1993-1994)).
163. Id. at 1220 (citing Wis. STAT. § 165.075 (1993-1994)).
164. See State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 WI 9, 1$ 49-54, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 1 49-54, 605
N.W.2d 526, 1$ 49-54 (holding that the attorney general lacked the authority to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute at issue). However, the attorney general's powers could be
constitutionally modified.
165. Cusack, supra note 104, at 183 (citing Linda J. Bozung, Resource Uses, in RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151, 153 (P.L.I. Litig. & Admin. Practice
Handbook Series No. H4-4963, 1985) ("Problems arise, however, when the constitutional
provision directs the legislature to maintain actively a healthful environment for the people
but does not specifically state whether legislation is necessary before a party can sue to
enforce the legislature's obligation.")).
166. See Sinykin, supra note 1, at 646.
167. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
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and navigable waters,' and ensure the development of proper
environmental impact statements,1 69 while serving as a check on the
actions of the DNR.17
0
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Any constitutional provision dealing with the environment must
balance the competing interests of economic growth and development
with protection of natural resources and a healthy environment. 171
"[T]he problem for the judge is that not only is environmentalism 'in'
the state constitution, it is a value potentially at odds with the prevailing
individualist orientation of American law."'
72
However, constitutional environmental provisions vary in the degree
to which they recognize this tradeoff. 173  "Most state constitutions
encourage the pursuit of environmental goals with no explicit
recognition of potential tradeoffs."' 7'  And if courts, like those in
Montana, embrace a strict scrutiny approach for a right to a healthful
environment, there is not much room for economic tradeoffs.' 75  Some
state constitutions recognize the tradeoff by recognizing the importance
of environmental protection as well as the need to use nature's
resources. 176  "Overall, the courts interpreting these environmentalprovisions convert them into some sort of 'rule of reasonableness' that
168. See Sinykin, supra note 1, at 652.
169. Id. at 653-54 (citing Pub. Intervenor v. Dep't of Transp., No. 91CV001869 (Dane
County, Wis. Cir. Ct. May 13, 1991)).
170. See generally id. at 669. For example, in Town of Two Rivers v. Department of
Natural Resources, 105 Wis. 2d 721, 315 N.W.2d 377 (Ct. App. 1981), the public intervenor
challenged the DNR's refusal to hold a public hearing regarding proposed waste disposal
sites.
171. See State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136 (Mont. 1977); Federated Conservationists of
Westchester County, Inc. v. Reid, 377 N.Y.S.2d 380, 384 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (both recognizing
that there is a tradeoff between individual property rights and public environmental rights).
172. Ledewitz, supra note 125, at 65.
173. Thompson, supra note 2, at 872-73.
174. Thompson, supra note 112, at 162.
175. See id. at 191.
176. Thompson, supra note 2, at 873 ("Some state constitutions, such as Hawaii's,
implicitly recognize the need for tradeoffs by emphasizing both the need to protect natural
resources and the environment and, either in the same or a related section, the need to
'promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with their
conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State."' HAW. CONST. art. XI, §
1. "A few constitutions place explicit limits on environmental goals. The Louisiana
Constitution, for example, mandates a 'healthful' environment only 'insofar as possible and
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people."' LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.).
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minimizes harm to the environment and balances environmental harm
against the legitimate rights of property." 177
One can already see this tension between environmentalism and
public use, broadly defined, and private interests and economic growth
in existing Wisconsin law. For example, in enforcement of the public
trust doctrine, there is a tension under Wisconsin law between the
constitution's public rights in navigable waterways with, first, private
rights of riparian owners who, unlike the beds of all other navigable
waters, own the beds under navigable streams, 178 and, second, the desire
to convey trust property for broader public purposes than the traditional
uses.
As noted earlier, in Doemel, the court held that a riparian owner has
"exclusive privileges of the shore for purposes of access to his land and
the water., 179 This limits public access to the state's water resources. In
Wisconsin, unlike many states, owners of the bank of a navigable stream
by purchase from the United States are owners of the stream in front of
such purchase,'" but their ownership rights are subject to the rights of
the public to use the waterway as a public highway.'8
Similarly, the state can authorize encroachments (and even convey
lake bed land held in the public trust while still maintaining legal title)
for public purposes."8 Such encroachments necessarily limit certain
types of use and access to the state's water resources at those locations.
Thus development, in the form of piers, bridges, harbors and dams,
among other things, can be upheld by public trust doctrine, 183 and
chapter 30 of the Wisconsin Statutes allows the DNR to grant permits
"in the public interest" absent a more detailed standard.'" The state
177. Ledewitz, supra note 125, at 68 (citing Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control
Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984); Hamilton v. Diamond, 349 N.Y.S.2d 146 (App. Div.
1973); Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976)).
178. Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86, 95, 76 N.W. 273,274 (1898).
179. Doemel v. Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 234, 193 N.W. 393, 397 (1923).
180. Wade, 100 Wis. at 95, 97, 76 N.W. at 274 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1893)).
181. Id. at 97.
182. State v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 275 Wis. 112, 117, 81 N.W.2d 71, 73 (1957); see also
Scanlan, supra note 17, at 149.
183. See, e.g., Captain Soma Boat Line v. Wis. Dells, 79 Wis. 2d 10, 22, 255 N.W.2d 441,
446 (1977) (building a bridge); Pub. Serv. Comm., 275 Wis. at 117, 81 N.W.2d at 73
(permitting fill in Lake Wingra to aid navigation and recreational enjoyment); City of
Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 456, 214 N.W. 820, 832 (1927) (constructing piers that aid
navigation).
184. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 30.12(2); 30.123(4); 30.195(3); 30.20(7); 30.206 (2005-2006).
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administrative agencies must deal with the complexities and balancing
of competing interests in protecting the public trust-for environmental
interests themselves can even fall along a spectrum from conservation,
responsible and sustainable, yet utilitarian, use (the historical basis for
environmental law in Wisconsin), to complete perseveration of nature
from human destruction and exploitation. 185
With these competing interests, few constitutions have placed
explicit limits on environmental goals. 8 While implementation of
Wisconsin's public trust doctrine seeks to balance property rights and
social costs against the environmental rights of the public at the agency
level and the strict scrutiny approach should work in favor of
environmental protection, Louisiana courts have transformed the
healthful environment provision '8' into a ban on state actions that do not
pass a cost-benefit test." Courts do a cost-benefit analysis of the
environmental costs weighed against the social and economic benefits,
but also engage in a constitutionally derived environmental impact
statement considering alternative sites, alternative projects, and
mitigation measures."
Weighing the individual costs and benefits of a particular project is a
daunting task. Yet it is possible to consider the "cumulative impacts" of
permitting projects that may have adverse effects on natural resources.
Whether it is one, nine or ninety boat slips, each slip
allows one more boat which inevitably risks further
damage to the environment and impairs the public's
interest in the lakes. The potential ecological impacts
include direct impacts on water quality and sediment
quality alteration, as well as direct and indirect influences
on flora and fauna. For this very reason, the
consideration of "cumulative impact" must be taken into
account. '90
185. See, e.g., ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE: ECOSYSTEMS,
DEMOCRACY, AND AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS 19-25 (2003).
186. Thompson, supra note 2, at 873.
187. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
188. See Kirsch, supra note 119, at 1196-97.
189. See id. at 1197 (citing Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d
1152 (La. 1984); In re Dravo Basic Materials Co., 604 So. 2d 630, 632 n.1 (La. Ct. App. 1992)).
190. Hilton v. Dep't Natural Res., 2006 WI 84, 1 28, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 1 28, 717 N.W.2d 166,
9 28 (quoting Sterlingworth Condo. Ass'n v. Dep't Natural Res., 205 Wis. 2d 710, 721, 556
N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (Ct. App. 1996)).
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While it is usually not possible to show that a specific shoreline
development project will result in specific adverse impacts on ecology,
tourism, and the economy, the cumulative impacts of many of these
projects may have devastating ecological, recreational, and associated
economic impacts.
Judicial cost-benefit balancing is an onerous task due to the difficulty
of properly valuing natural resources.1 91 Valuation of natural resources
requires reliance on contingent valuation 92 to get at people's willingness
to pay to protect natural resources and public areas, but no real
framework exists for how this can work in constitutional interpretation.
These complexities undergird the reasoning for leaving the resolution of
the economic versus environmental tradeoffs within the so-called
political branches of government through legislation and expert
administrative agency regulation, as opposed to in the courts. Creating
a Public Intervenor Office, as suggested earlier, might also ease the
resolution of these tradeoffs as the office can make efforts to increase
cooperation between environmentalists and industry, limiting some
transaction costs in the tradeoff debate.1 93
The tradeoff is a complicated one-for preservation and
conservation can both harm and promote economic and industrial
growth. For example, land conservation may affect economic growth
either negatively by removing land from commercial uses or positively
by attracting new business to the area. 94 In Wisconsin, while industries
depend upon consumption of state natural resources, environmental
protection can help promote the state's large tourism and recreational
sports industries. Tourism is the state's second largest industry,
191. See Czarnezki & Zahner, supra note 154.
192. Id. at 521 (quoting Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 475 (D.C. Cir.
1989)) ("[Contingent valuation] 'set[s] up hypothetical markets to elicit ... [the] economic
valuation of a natural resource,' and is used when there are no adequate models of market
behavior available to measure use or non-use values.").
193. Cf Sinykin, supra note 1, at 659. If one engages in cost-benefit analysis, the low
cost of maintaining the Public Intervenor Office versus the potential high cost of
environmental degradation and the difficulty in the valuation of natural resources may
warrant a constitutionally mandated office. The Public Intervenor Office was a "lean and
economical state entity" comprising a small fraction of the state budget (.0015% of the $15.5
billion 1994 state budget), less than a nickel per citizen. Id. at 648 (citing Wis. Stewardship
Network, FAQ: Didn't Taxpayers Save Money by Eliminating the Intervenors?,
http://www.wsn.org/issues/PlOsavemoney.html; Arlen Christenson, Wis. Stewardship
Network, The Vital Role of the Public Intervenor, http://www.wsn.org/issues/PIOchristenson
.html).
194. See David J. Lewis et al., Public Conservation Land and Employment Growth in the
Northern Forest Region, 78 LAND ECON. 245, 245-46 (2002).
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accounting for $5.7 billion in 1994 and up to $11.7 billion in 2002. '9 The
state's cabins, lodges, fishermen, hunters, and camping grounds all
depend on the state's natural resources, and development can harm the
natural resources upon which these industries rely. ' 96
Due to the administrative and technical difficulties in making
substantive assessments of the relative "economic" impacts of
preserving versus developing natural resources, agencies have sought to
limit the review of the direct physical and economic impacts on
individual property, to avoid discussion of "secondary socioeconomic
impacts," and to discourage any judicial balancing by putting an
economic value on natural resources." Instead, the constitution might
textually embrace the notion that private property owners do not have
inherent rights to change the "essential natural character of their land"
for development purposes.198
V. CONCLUSION
Environmental law is an institutionalized tradeoff between, on the
one hand, the public's environmental rights and natural resource
protection, and, on the other, economic growth and development. This
is not a simple tradeoff-industry depends upon natural resources in
ways that both preserve and use the environment (e.g., scenic beauty
and habitat for fish, and raw materials such as lumber and land). Any
state constitution must consider whether and how to balance these
interests. Constitutions nearly always recognize some protection of
private property and individual rights, yet are environmentalism and
public rights in natural resources adequately addressed? To adequately
address these interests, Wisconsin might consider expansion of the
public trust doctrine to allow for greater public access and to protect
biodiversity and groundwater, including an environmental policy
statement to symbolize the state's environmental ethic or including a
195. Sinykin, supra note 1, at 662 (citing Wis. DEP'T OF TOURISM, 2002 ECONOMIC
PROFILES, available at http://agency.travelwisconsin.com/Research/EconomiclmpactActive/
02countyprofiles.shtm); see also WIS. DEP'T OF TOURISM, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
EXPENDITURES BY TRAVELERS ON WISCONSIN CALENDAR YEAR 2005 (2006).
196. For example, shoreline development in Wisconsin may result in smaller and fewer
fish. Emily Carlson, Univ. of Wis., Scientists Assess Shoreline Development Impact, Sept. 3,
2002, http://www.news.wisc.edu/7775.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). This could potentially
impact the recreational fishing industry.
197. See Wis.'s Envtl. Decade v. Dep't Natural Res., 115 Wis. 2d 381, 340 N.W.2d 722
(1983).
198. See generally Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768
(1972).
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stronger affirmative right to a healthy environment, and creating
mechanisms to improve standing in environmental cases. Adding these
provisions may, at minimum, balance interests between economics and
the environment in the Wisconsin Constitution, and, at most, tip the
balance of private and public decision making closer to
environmentalism.
